The September 11th attacks on the US concentrated peoples' minds on the growing importance of so called 'non-traditional' security threats. These are threats to national security that do not arise from a direct military challenge from other nation-states in the international system. They are not necessarily military and come from sources other than nation-states. The terms non-traditional and 'new security' come from Western International Relations and Security Studies research, that has increasingly focused on such security challenges since the end of the Cold War.

In particular the events of September 11th brought to the fore the threat from terrorist actors, and their links to extremist, separatist and transnational criminal groups. Thus, it brought to the top of the public agenda the threat posed by individuals and small groups of actors to the security of the national-state. However, the reality is that this is not a new type of threat and long before September 11th such threats have been taken into account by the security policies' of all nation-states. And in particular, the region of Central Asia was already fully aware of such 'non-traditional' threats, following a number of terrorist bombings in Tashkent in 1999 and 2000, the incursion of armed Islamic radical groups into the territory of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and situation of lawlessness in certain areas along the Afghan border.

New Security Challenges in Central Asia.

Across the world there has been a growth in regional security organizations designed to meet these new challenges. This is because it is being increasing accepted that regional responses are the most effective way to address these types of security problems. The logic behind this view is that the source of these threats emanate from the level of individuals, and in the vast majority of cases involves connections between such individuals across national borders within a region. For example, organized terrorist networks, such as Al-Qaeda or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or organized criminal groups such as the ones operating in narcotic trafficking from Afghanistan across the Eurasian space and the Columbian drug cartels transporting drugs to the USA.

Therefore, it has been widely recognized that a coordinated response is required, as any single effective national policy will be undermined simply by the terrorists or organized criminal groups switching their focus to what they consider a 'softer target' state in the region, in order to continue operating as they wish across the whole region.

After the resolution of border demarcations disputes between the region's states, the SCO has dedicated itself to becoming the primary vehicle for tackling these types of security challenges in the Central Asian region, in particular the struggle with what has defined as the three evils ? terrorism, extremism and separatism. Each of the SCO member-states has particular security concerns with regard to these threats, Russia with Chechnya, China with Xinjiang Province, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser extent Kazakhstan with militant Islamic groups, and for all states in the wider region there are security challenges relating to transnational organized crime, drug and people trafficking and many other concerns emanating from the instable situation in Afghanistan, even after the US led operation there.

SCO and New Security

SCO represents an interesting attempt to tackle these challenges. All its member-states are experienced in having to deal with these problems and have a common interest in doing so, and in this sense the SCO presents an interesting test case of a multi-lateral regional solution to the challenges of terrorism and organized crime. A major challenge for any regional multi-state framework that wishes to address threats such as terrorism, separatism and extremism is the coordination of national policies on a regional level. And the SCO at least acknowledges that a region-wide approach is required to meet the challenges it faces.

The SCO declaration at the Moscow Summit in 2003 states that 'the SCO member states believe that no country in the world can ward off present-day terrorism, the drugs threat or other trans-border challenges at a time of the growing globalization of political, economic and social processes'. As with any multi-lateral organization the coordination of each member-states policy is a priority and a very difficult task. The SCO must try to convince each member-state that the regional level, and the SCO itself, is the best way to solve challenges, such as terrorism and organized crime, to their national security. The maintenance of this coordination will most likely by the key determinant of the success of the SCO in terms of addressing 'new security'.

The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS)

The RATS is the main security organ of the SCO dedicated to the struggle with terrorism, separatism and extremism and it is defined by a separate treaty, the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, which acts as the guiding framework for the activity of the RATS. The SCO Charter sets out the aim of the RATS as the 'development and implementation of measures aimed at jointly counteracting terrorism, separatism and extremism, illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and also illegal migration'.

The central functions of the RATS surround the mutual exchange of information and intelligence between member states, the development of complementary process for identifying, addressing and punishing actors contravening the convention throughout the SCO region and the joint development of methods to combat sub-state security threats. The RATS is an attempt to create a clearing-house for information and intelligence on actors identified as representing a threat to the regions security, be it on a region-wide scale or to a specific state or zone within or across states. And it is hoped it will become a forum for superior research and analysis of terrorism and methods of addressing terrorism, and dispersing this information in the form of training and policy advice to the individual state apparatus. Thus, the aim is that it will enable the individual member states to coordinate their national legislative and internal security procedures with other SCO member states, and to develop a region-wide approach that will maximize the effectiveness of counter-terrorist measures.

This represents a very innovative and modern approach to the tasks that have been assigned the SCO. It acknowledges the connected nature of many of the security challenges that confront it. To this end the SCO has a very holistic interpretation of security problems in the region, particularly concentrating on the links between the drug trade and terrorist, separatist and extremist groups. This was also highlighted by the Moscow Summit declaration, which states that 'the SCO member states, recognising the transnational nature of today's terrorism and being in the forefront of the fight against its practical manifestations, are following a course of mutual cooperation and vigorous participation in the efforts of the world community in the struggle against terrorism, in particular, in stopping its financing channels.

In this matter they assign an important role to close collaboration between the law enforcement agencies and secret services, and also the defence agencies of the SCO member states'. However, it is not envisaged that a permanent SCO counter-terrorism military unit or joint military operations will be created, although joint anti-terrorist exercises take place including the biggest yet will take place later this year. In the main, the SCO has elected to concentrate on the harmonisation of its member states national approaches to these challenges, and primarily the exchange of intelligence and cooperation in meeting these challenges. This is a sensible and effective approach to such security concerns, as traditional military force is not an effective or appropriate tool against an enemy that is so hard to identify as seen with the continuing problems faced by NATO operation in Afghanistan. Instead sub-state security is better focused on intelligence gathering and effective internal policing of terrorist and criminal groups, and this is precisely what makes the SCO an interesting organisation, because it seeks to offer an alternative solution to such 'new' security challenges.

Some analysts remain sceptical of claims that the RATS represents a clearing-house of intelligence, arguing that the capacity of RATS to function as it intends will be limited by the unwillingness of the SCO states to exchange hard intelligence material. This is undoubtedly a challenge for the RATS, primarily in convincing its member states that it is best option for their security. Thus, for the RATS to become an effective organ that the nation-states can rely on, the states themselves first need to allow it some latitude to act independently and be prepared to commit their own resources in the expectation of receiving greater intelligence in return.

How do you assess success in tackling 'new security' threats?

The SCO is yet to conclusively prove itself an effective tool in addressing the many non-traditional threats present in Central Asia, and to do this it faces some difficult challenges as do all regional security frameworks around the world designed to meet this task. Multi-lateral frameworks designed to address these threats, including the SCO face significantly different challenges to groups organised on the basis of traditional interstate conflict and cooperation. A major difficulty is the directing and focusing of its member-states towards common approaches not just in their policy towards the region but also in their national policy, as for terrorists and organized crime there is no distinction between the two.

However, unlike a traditional multi-lateral security organization it is very difficult to monitor if the member-states are fulfilling their obligations and if a policy is effective, as it is virtually impossible to monitor the response and effect upon the secretive world of terrorism and organized crime. Thus, an international organization formed to address non-traditional security issues, such as the SCO, must somehow manage to consistently exert influence over the leaderships of its members to ensure their compliance with its policy approach even though it has no jurisdiction to enforce this. It is also difficult for a regional framework to accurately assess the success of its approach with regard to defeating terrorism, as it only takes one plot to be successful and its policies will be deemed a failure. Thus, the primary function of any such grouping must be information gathering, and this is no easy task when your dealing with networks of individuals who do not want to be found. But this is the task the SCO faces.

Can the SCO claim success in the struggle with terrorism, separatism and extremism?

It is very early days to assess the success or failure in the struggle with terrorism and narcotic trafficking in Central Asia, and while there is no doubting these threats remain priority problems for all nation-states in the region, the SCO can at least claim some limited success in reducing the level of threat. The change in focus of the SCO itself towards economic cooperation can be viewed as the result of a common belief in the region that the threat posed by terrorism, separatism and extremism has declined from the years of 1999-2001. This has allowed economic programmes to begin against a background of a more stable security environment.

However, as with everything surrounding the world of terrorism and extremist militants, it is unclear how much credit the SCO can claim for this as of course in this period the US led operation in Afghanistan dramatically changed the situation both there and in Central Asia, reducing the porosity of the Afghan border with the SCO member-states. Yet it is clear, that for both Russia and China, there has been a reduction in the tensions from Chechnya and Xinjiang respectively, in part because of policies adopted by the Central Asian Republics under the SCO. And while, terrorism, separatism and extremism remain a high priority for the Central Asian leaderships, with the possible exception of Kazakhstan, it is also possible to argue, that information gathering and intelligence sharing has to some extent been successful as there has been no major terrorist bombings or attacks in the SCO space in the time since the RATS began its work. Although, there have of course been other security problems in this time.

It is clear that Afghanistan must remain a major consideration for the SCO, it is the source of huge amounts of narco-traffic into Central Asia, as is connected in various ways to many of the other security challenges important to region's states. Thus, the SCO should continue and enhance its collaborative work with the Afghan leadership through development of SCO-Afghan working group to address these problems that effect the whole wider-region of Eurasia. The SCO should also bear in mind that with the continued difficulties faced by NATO in Afghanistan and with increasing unease amongst the domestic population of the NATO states about the presence of their troops in Afghanistan, that the NATO presence there may not be long-term and may not leave behind a resolved situation. Thus, the SCO must be ready to deal with Afghanistan without NATO and to potentially to step into the void left by a NATO exit.